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CHAPTER I.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
A master is responsible for the wrongful act of a ser-
vant even if it be willful, or reckless, or malicious provided
the act is done by the servant within the scope of his employ-
ment, and in the furtherance of his master's business, or for
his master's benefit. But if the servant, at the time he does
the wrong is not acting in the execution of his master's bus-
iness and within the scope of his employment as a servant but
is carrying into effect some exclusive object of his own, the
master will not be answerable for his act. Thus it is said in
Noys Maxims "If I comiand my servant to destrain and he ride on
the distress he shall be punished and not I" so "If my servant
contrary to my will chase my beast into the soil of another, I
shall not be punished and if my servant without my knowledge
put my beast in anothers land my servant is the trespasser and
not I because by the voluntary putlting of the beast there with-
out my assent he gains a special property right in them for
the time and so to this purpose they are his beasts.,,.
But where the servant though acting contrary to his duty
to his master is nevertheless acting in the course of his em-
ployment the master will be answerable for his misconduct. Thus
in Seymour v Greenwood, 6 H. & N. 359, where a partially in-
toxicated passenger in an omnibus refused to get out and pay
his farw when the omnibus arrived at its destination, enid the
conductor dragged him out violently and recklessly causing him
to fall under the wheel of a passing cab, it was held that
there was evidence for the jury of the wrongful act having been
done by the servant in the course of his employment about the
master's business, and the omnibus owner was made responsible
for the injury.
In applying this rule to a corporation it is of course
necessary to take into consideration its character and organ-
ization, the scope of the authority of the agent who has comnm-
itted the tort, and the character of the business for which he
is employed must likewise be taken into consideration.
CHAPTER II.
GENERAL LIABILITY FOR TORTS OF AGENTS AND SFZVANTS.
--- 000---
The general rule is that corporations are liable for
torts of all descriptions committed by themselves or by their
duly authorized agents in the course of their duty and with
their authority and not involving intention on the part of the
wrongdoer.
Corporations are not created, it is no part of their
business to commit torts nevertheless courts of law have de-
cided that they must be held liable for the torts committed by
their agents and servants acting within the scope of their
authority upon the same principle and by precisely analogous
reasoning as they have been made responsible for fraud. Thus
an action for trespass to the person or for trespass to the
property in any of the numerous ways in which this is done,
trover will lie against the corporation as against an individ-
ual. The agent of the corporation must of course be acting
within his authority and upon this point difficult questions
arise as to first, where the agent can be deemed to have acted
as such so as to bind his principa and secondly, as to the ex-
tent of his authority and more especially his implied authority.
The general proposition may be laid down that corporations
are liable for torts coimnitted by their agents about the cor-
porate entorprise, if acting in the usual manner of carrying
out their duty even though acting contrary to particular and
specific instructions.
In tho case of Philadelphia & Reading R. R. Co., v Derby,
14 Howard 468, the plaintiff brought action against the rail-
road company for injuries received in a collision. The rail-
road company set up as a defense that the engineer 1h.ving con-
trol of the colliding locomotive was forbidden to run on the
track at that time and had acted in disobedience to such order,
and that they were not liable for his acts. The court held,
that this was no defense, that a master is liable for the tor-
tious acts of his servant when done in the course of his em-
ployment, although they may be done in disobedience of the mas-
ter's orders.
This proposition holds good as a general statement but
is subject to certain limitations. First, the agent must have
general authority founded on the ordinary mode or custom of
performing his duty; secondly, he must have acted with bona
fides and believing and intending that he was carrying out his
duty as agent;.and thirdly, the special instruction must be
really so definite and pointing to particular matters, and not
amotrut to a general limitation of authority.
In Bette v De Vintre, L. R. 3 Ch. 429, 441, it was de-
cided that it was no answer to a suit against the directors of
a company for infringement of a patent to allege that the acts
were done by worknen employed by the directors contrary to
their orders. The judge in delivering the opinion said "I
will assume that the orders not to work in a particular manner
were given, and that the disobedience of those orders was se-
cret, although the evidence hardly warrants such a conclusion,
but granting all this to be the case I shall still hold the
directors liable."
Likewise in the case of Bayley v M1anchester etc. R.R.Co.,
L. R. 8 . C. P. 148, the plaintiff a passenger on the defen-
dant's railroad sustained injuries by being violently pulled
out of the car after the train had started by one of the defen-
dant's porters who acted under the impression that the plain-
tiff was a trespasser. On the trial it was shown that each
porter was furnished with a set of rules which stated that under
no circumstances was a passenger to be permitted to leave a car
while the train was in motion. And the defendant claimed the
porter was outside his employment, but the court held that al-
6though he had neglected his directions nevertheless he was in
the scope of his employment and the defendant was liable.
CHAPTER III.
LIABILITY FOR THE WILFUL AND MALICIOUS TORTS
OF AGENTS AND SERVANTS.
--- 000---
In regard to the ultra vires acts committed by agents,
the English rule differs from the generally accepted American
doctrine.
The English rule as generally understood is an agent has
no implied authority to commit , and cannot on that ground mere-
ly, bind his principal, a corporation, by coimmitting an ultra
vires tort. But sembleif a corporation expressly directs an
ultra viros tort or proceedings necessarily caUsing such a tort,
it is liable therefor.
In England at present this question remains without pre-
cise decision. It was discussed in Herman v Tappanden, 1 East
555 and Maund v Monmouthshireetc. Canal Co., 2 Dowl. (N.S.)l]Z.
But neither of these cases involve exactly the point in ques-
tion. In Mill v Hawker, L. R. 9 Ex. 309, the point arose on
argument though not an actual decision and in the strong dis-
senting opinion by Kelly, C. B.
The American doctrine is that a corporation is liable
for the wilful torts of its agents when conmnitted in the appar-
ent scope of their corporate powers,some text writers say in
the apparent scope of their employment.
Liability fot the Acts of inisterial Aa .
General Superintendent. The general superintendent is
the immedtate representative of the company and the company is
liable for an injury resulting from his negligence in giving an
improper order the same as if such order had eminated directly
from the corporation. Washbourn v Nashville etc.R.R. 3 Head.638.
Directors and Managers. A corporation may be said to
be liable for the acts of the directors and managers when act-
ing in the discharge of their official duties and within the
scope of their authority as managers of the company. In the
case of Catchpole v Amborgate etc. R.R.Co., ! Ell. & Bl. 120,
where the plaintiff set forth that he was entitled to certain
"ear marked shares" in a railroad company that these shares had
wrongfully been declared forfeited, that the forfeiture had
been conf'irmed at a general meeting of the shareholders of the
company and the shares directed to be sold, it was held that
there was a good cause of action against the company. So,
where the directors had been guilty of a wrongful act of omis-
sion in not regist ring the plaintiff's name in their books
whereby the plaintiff was deprived of the ordinary privileges
of a shareholder and of any profits that might have arisen upon
the shares,it was held that the company was responsible for the
wrongful acts of the directors.
But where the directors have acted beyond the scope of
their authority the company is not responsible for their acts,
but the directors themselves are the parties to be made person-
ally responsible in damages; thus, where the directors have
signed false and fraudulent reports of the state and circum-
stances of the company such directors and-not the company are
the proper parties to be sued for damages resulting from the
misrepresentation. No body Of shareholders can authorize the
directors to put forward fraudulent representations and false
accounts of transactions of the company so as to render the
company at large responsible for the fraud. That is a course
which no body of shareholders could sanction against a single
dissenting or a single absent shareholder. in Davidson v Tul-
loch, 3 Macq. 783, where false reports of the actual condition
and circumstances of a joint stock company were knowingly and
designedly printed and circulated by the defendants and others
in concert with them with their signatures appended, and the
plaintiff relying upon the representations contained in those
reports of the flourishing state of the concern,bought shares
in it and lost his money and encouraged serious liability, it
was held that he was entitled to maintain an action for damages
against the defendant.
Liability for Torts of General Agents. and Servants.
As a general rule a corporation is liable for any wrong-
ful or negligent acts, or omission on the part of any of its
servants or agents which causes a violation of any duty or ob-
ligation owed by the corporation to the injured person; and
this is true whether the corporation owes to the injured person
special duties arising from contract, so that the tort occas-
ions a breach of contract, or whether it be a duty owed to the
injured person merely as a member of the commnity, a duty main-
ly based upon the maxim "Sic utere tuo ut alienura non laedas".
First what is the liability of a corporation for their
breach of duty arising out of contractual relations? This has
mainly to do with common carriers. The general rule is that
the rule relieving a master from liability for a malicious in-
jury inflicted by his servant when not acting within the scope
of his employment does not apply as between a common carrier of
passengers and a passenger. Such a carrier undertakes to pro-
tect the passengers against any injury arisihg from the negli-
gence or wilftl misconduct of its servants while engaged in per-
forming a duty which the carrier owes to the passenger.
In Stewart v Brooklyn C. T. R. R., 90 N. Y. 588, defen-
dant was a railroad corporation owning and operating a street
railroad in the city of Brooklyn. The plaintiff was a passen-
ger on defendant's horse car having no conductor, the driver
being the only person in charge of the car acting both as driver
and conductor. While the plaintiff was on the car a newsboy
jumped on it and was ordered off by the driver; the boy got off,
the driver stopped his car, tied the reins around the brake
handle,climbed over the front dashboard, ran after the boy,
caught him, and beat him. The lwssengers interfered to pro-
tect the boy. Afterwards the driver returned to the car and
startaBd it, but, being excited began to abuse the passengers
calling them bastards etc. and finally entered the car, seized
the plaintiff by the coat, pushed and knocked his head against
the panels of the window at the same time striking him across
the head with the butt end of his whip thus beating the plain-
tiff severely. The court held that although it was clearly
outside the scope of his employment and not for the master's
benefit, nevertheless the master was liable as he owed the duty
to protect his rassengers from all injuries during their stay
in his cars.
In Higgins v Vatervliet Turnpike Co., 40 N. Y. 23, the
plaintiff was a passenger in defendants horse car. He had paid
his fare and was forcibly thrown from the car by defendant's
conductor and driver who claimed that he was drunk and dis-
orderly. Held, that the company was liable. So, also, where
there was justifiable cause for ejection but excessive force
was used. This case lays down the rule, a master is respon-
sible civiliter for the wrongful acts of his servant if such
acts were committed in the business of the master and within
the scope of the servant's employment and this though in doing
it he departed from the instructions of the master.
Now in regard to the liabiliV- of the corporation where
it owes no special duty, except the duty it owes to the whole
world, "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas". It may be said
that the corporation will be held liable for all injuries and
losses occasioned to any one by the negligence of its employees
in any matter connected with their employment.
In Palmeri v The M. R. Co., 133 NT. Y. 261, plaintiff
purchased a ticket of one of the defendant's agents and after
some altercation about the amount of change, passed through
the gate to take a train. The agent followed her out upon the
platform charging her with having passed upon him a counterfeit
twenty-five cent piece and demanded another in its place. She
refused, insisting that her money was genuine and refused to
give back the change received. The agent called her a counter-
feiter and a common prostitute, placed his hand upon her and
told I-r not to stir until he had procured a policeman to ar-
rest and search her. He detained her on the platform for a
while but on getting an officer let her go. Hold, that an
action for damages was maintainable, that in the acts complained
of the agent was engaged about the defendant's affairs endeav-
oring to recover and jrvotect its property and so it was respon-
sible for his acts.
In the case of Cohen v The D. D. E. B. and B. R.R.Co.,69
N. Y. 170, plaintiff while travelling in a buggy along a street
in the city of New York was stopped by a blockade of vehicles
just as he had crossed defendant's tracks. The rear of his
buggy was so near the tracks that a car could not pass without
hitting it. A car came up, the driver of which after waiting a
moment or two ordered the plaintiff to "get off the track".
Plaintiff was unable to move either way and so notified the
driver who replied with an oath that he was late and if the
plaintiff did not get off he would put him off and immediately
thereafter drove on, striking and upsetting the defendant's
buggy and injuring him. In an action to recover damages, it
was held, that a master who puts the servant in a place of
trust or commaits to him the management of his business or care
of his property is justly held responsible when the servant
through lack of judgment or discretion or from infirmity of
temper or under the influence of lWssion aroused by the cir-
stances and occasion goes beyond the strict line of duty or
authority and inflicts an unjustifiable injury upon another.
Wade v Thayer, 40 Cal. 578.
Drew v Sixth Ave. R. R. Co., 26 N. Y. 49
Weed v Panama R. R. Co., 17 N. Y. 363.
Sanford v Eighth Ave. R. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 343.
Goddard v G. T. R. R. 57 Me. 202.
A corporation is held liable where the act done was in
the apparent scope of the agent's authority even though his em-
ployment was for an entirely different object.
In Flick v C. & N. R. Co.,68 Wis. 469, a ticket agent
left another employee in charge of the ticket office who failed
to return the proper change and upon being asked therefor by
the purchaser assaulted and struck the latter. The court held
in this case that even though this employee had no authority
from the company to sell tickets arnl that the railroad company
was liable.
As to when the corporation ts not to be hold liable for
the tofts of its agents and servants, it may be said that a
corporation is not liable for the acts of its servants and
agents when they act wholly without the scope of their employ-
ment.
In Central R. R. v Peacock, 69 Md. 257, plaintiff was a
passenger of defendant's street car to whom the the driver who
was also conductor used profane and insulting language. The
plaintiff replied "When we get to the office of the company I
will report you',, the office being at the stables where the
cars stopped to change horses. Before reaching the stables
where the car stopped to change horses the plaintiff got off
intending as he said, to go to the office of the company and
report the drives while the horses were being changed and then
to resume his seat in the car but such intention was not com-
municated to the driver. The driver seeing the plaintiff going
towards the office of the company, stopped the car and jumping
off went across, intercepted the Imssenger on the sidewalk and
violently assaulted him. In an action against the railroad
company to recover damages it was held, that when the assault
was committed the contract of carriage had ceased, that the
wrongful act of the driver was not within the line and scope of
his employment and the railroad company, his employer was not
liable.
In the E. & C. R. R. Co. v Baum,26 Ind. 72, Frazer, J.
in delivering the opinion of the court said, "A master is re-
sponsible ordinarily for the consequences resulting to others
from the negligence or want of skill with which his employees
do his business. This responsibility results from the duty
he owes to others as a member of the coimmnity to employ careful
and skilled servants to the end that his fellow men may not
suffer by the negligence or ignorance with which the master's
business is done. it is but a reasonable requirement easily
fulfilled and the law in this respect req~ires merely the per-
formance of that which the proper care of third persons would
demand. But a wilful and malicious trespass of the servant
not commanded or ratified by the master but evidently perpe-
trated to gratify the private hate or malignity of the servant
under the mere color of discharging the duty which he had under-
taken for his employer has been held by unifonm and unbroken
current of decisions ever since Ic Manus v Cricket,1 East.106,
to give no right of action against the master.
A corporation is excused from liability for the torts of
its agents when the person injured brings the injury upon him-
self by his own act and through his own fault. In Scott v
Central Park &c. R. R. Co., 53 Hun 414, the action was brought
to recover damages from the defendant for an assault comiittod
upon the plaintiff by the driver of one of the cars of the de-
fendant while plaintiff was a passenger thereon. The evidence
upon the part of the defendant in this action showed that the
plaintiff got upon the front part of one of the cars owned by
defendant. Upon boarding the car, he conmenced an altercation
with the driver using language which was /ery abusive, insult-
ing and liable to bring about a personal encounter which re-
sult followed to the detriment of the plaintiff. The court
held that it was clear that the act of the driver was not in
the course of his employment and that the defendant can only be
held under the rule that as a passenger must submit himself to
the custody of the employees of the carrier the carrier must be
responsible for the acts of the employees that constitute a
trespass against the passenger even though they be malicious
and wilful. But the reason of such a rule has no application
to a case where the trespass is brought about by the improper
behavior of the passenger which caused the assault of which he
complains. The duties of the carrier and the passenger are
reciprocal. The carrier is bound to protect the passenger and
tho passenger, in order to entitle himself to this protection,
is bound to behave in a decent and orderly manner.
In the case of the Little Miami R. R. v Whetmore,19 Oh.
St. 110, the plaintiff after purchasing a ticket as a passenger
applied to the agent of the defendant charged with the duty of
checking baggage to have his baggage checked to his place of
destination and by his importunate conduct and abusive language
towards the servant provoked a quarrel in which the servant to
gratify his personal resentment struck the plaintiff. Held,
that the wrongful act In striking the plaintiff cannot be re-
garded as authorized by the master nor as an act done in the
execution of the service for which he is engaged by the master.
And the fact that the blow was inflicted with a hatchet fur-
nished by the master to be used for a wholly different purpose
in connection with the servant's business is immaterial as re-
spects the liability of the master.
Steamboat Ohio v Stunt, 10 Ohio. St. 582, in effect
holds that the master is not responsible for an assault by a
servant with which assault the master was in no way connected.
Also in the case of Steamboat 191essenger v Preston, 13 Oh.
St. 255, the court in delivering its opinion said, ",Where a ser-
vant goes outside of his employment and while not acting pur-
suance of the authority given him inflicts a wilful injury upon
one not entrusted to his care by the master or on one to whom
the master owes no duty the act will be that of the servant
alone and the master cannot be held liable.
In regard to when the corporation is excused from lia-
bility for torts of agents, a clear statement is givon by Judge
Cooley in his work on "Torts" at page 535. He says, "The lia-
bility of the master for the intentional acts which constitute
legal wrong can only arise when that which Is done is within
the real or apparent scope of the agent's authority and for the
matter's benefit. It does not arise when the servant has step-
ped aside from his employment to coimnit a tort which the mas-
ter neither dirocted in fact nor could be supposed from the
nature of his employment to have authorized or expected his
servant to do." He illustrates "So if the conductor of a
train of cars leaves his train to beat a personal enemy or from
mere wantonness to inflict any injury, the difference between
this case and that in which a passenger is ejected from the cars
is obvious. The one is a trespass he has stepped aside to
commit', the other Is comiitted in the scope of his employment".
This statement of law by this eminent jurist seems to be
supported by direct decisions.
Crooker v New London R. R. , 24 Conn. 249.
Pittshurg &c. Pass. R.R.Co. v Donohue, 70 Pa. St. 119.
Wright v Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343.
Mott v Consumer's Ice Co., 73 N. Y. 543.
Chicago and Eastern R.R. v Flexman, 103 Ill. 546.
Isaacs v Third Ave. R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 123.
Richmond Turnpike Co. v Vanderbilt., I Hill 480.
affirmed 2 Comst. 482.
Hibbard v Erie R. R. Co., 15 N. Y. 45.
Frazer v Freeman, 43 N. Y. 56C.
Roe v Birkenhead,etc. R. R. Co., 7 Exoh. 36.
Moore v Sanborn, 2 Mvich. 519.
In conclusion we may say as a general test that where
the liability of the corporation is not measured by contractual
relations to the person injured the corporation is always lia-
ble for the wilful and malicious torts when committed within
the scope or the apparent scope of the agent's authority about
the master's business and for his benefit.
This test cannot be applied in the case of common car-
riers who hold the peculiar contractual relation with the out-
side world and their liability is very sweeping.
The corporation is not liable when the agent or servant
acts wholly without his authority for his own personal interests
and also in the case where the injured person brings on his in-
jury through the result of his own wrongful act.
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